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Data
Abstract: Suppose Alice holds a DNA sequence and Bob
owns a database of DNA sequences. They want to de-
termine whether there is a match for the Alice’s input in
the Bob’s database for any purpose such as diagnosis of
Alice’s disease. However, Alice does not want to reveal
her DNA pattern to Bob, since it would enable him to
learn private information about her. For the similar rea-
sons, Bob does not want to reveal any information about
his database to Alice. This problem has attracted atten-
tion from bioinformatics community in order to protect
privacy of users and several solutions have been pro-
posed. Efficiency is always a bottleneck in cryptography
domain. In this paper, we propose ESCOT protocol to
address privacy preserving Edit distance using Obliv-
ious Transfer (OT) for the first time. We evaluate our
approach on a genome dataset over both LAN andWAN
network. Experimental results confirm feasibility of our
approach in real-world scenarios.
Keywords: Privacy, Genomic Data, Oblivious Transfer,
Secure two-party Computation
1 Introduction
Edit distance algorithm approximates how similar two
DNA sequences are. This similarity then can be used
in finding similar cancer patients across organizations
which helps in deciding the appropriate treatment. Due
to privacy constraints, organizations are not willing to
reveal their clients’ private information.
Problem Definition: In this paper, we aim to
propose an efficient privacy preserving protocol to find
the most similar patients in a database on a panel of
genes measured by the Edit distance between a query
sequence and sequences in the database. Formally, the
server and client want to privately compute the distance
between one versus N sequences. The client’s input rep-
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resents a sequence X while the server holds N sequences
Y1, ..., YN . Then, they jointly calculate the Edit distance
between X and each Yi. At the end of the protocol, Yis
with less than k distance to X will be returned to the
client.
This problem is a type of secure two-party compu-
tation in which two parties jointly compute a function
on their private inputs without disclosing their data to
each other except the final output. Recently, secure com-
putation has attracted attention in computational biol-
ogy and bioinformatics to preserve privacy of biological
data [5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15]. Early approaches were based
on pure (additive) Homomorphic Encryption (HE) e.g.,
[12]. Later work showed that protocols using generic se-
cure computation techniques such as Yao’s garbled cir-
cuits and GMW circuits outperform HE. These proto-
cols are based on either a combination of HE and circuit-
based approaches [5, 6, 13] or pure circuit-based tech-
niques [7, 14, 17].
On the other hand, recent optimization of Oblivious
Transfer (OT) – known as OT extension– is recognised
as the most efficient technology in two-party settings
[4, 11, 16]. For example, Demmler et al. showed that an
OT-based solution for privacy-preserving identification
outperforms HE and circuit-based techniques [11]. To
the best of our knowledge, we propose a privacy pre-
serving Edit distance using OT extension for the first
time.
However, communication is a bottleneck in the ex-
isting OT based protocols. Schneider showed that an
increase in the bit-length of the transferred data and/
or an increase in the number of the required OT lead to
a significant increase in communication bandwidth [18].
Kolensnikov et al. improved OT extension for transfer-
ring short messages such as binary messages [16] to ad-
dress communication overhead.
As comparison of two values is the main building
block for Edit distance algorithm, we reduce the prob-
lem of secure Edit distance into secure comparison and
propose an Efficient Secure Comparison protocol based
on Oblivious Transfer (ESCOT) with binary represen-
tation of the data transferring among computing par-
ties. We also provide the security and accuracy analy-
sis of ESCOT . We implemented ESCOT algorithm in
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Java and the source code will be available to reproduce
the results by the time the paper is published.
2 Background
In this Section, we provide some background informa-
tion about Edit distance algorithm and Oblivious Trans-
fer (OT).
2.1 Edit Distance
Definition: Edit distance d(X,Y ) between two strings
or sequence of characters X,Y is the minimum num-
ber of insertions, deletions and substitutions required
to transform X into Y .
In classic distance measures like Euclidean distance,
the sequences are required to have equal length. There-
fore, for measuring the similarity between DNA se-
quences with different lengths, more complicated dis-
tance measures like Edit distance are needed.
In our scenario, the client owns m-length sequence
of characters X and the server has m′-length sequence
of characters Y wherem 6= m′ and the characters belong
to a finite alphabet set. X can be transformed into Y by
applying Edit distance algorithm. The Edit distance is
the minimum aggregate cost necessary to perform this
transformation.
The basic Edit distance algorithm is Wanger-Fisher
[20] which works in a brute-force manner to compare
two sequences and its complexity is O(m×m′) or O(m2).
This quadratic complexity is inefficient in the cryptog-
raphy domain. Therefore, we need to seek for more so-
phisticated algorithms with lower complexity that help
privacy preserving genome analysis.
Ukkonen’s algorithm [19] improves Wagner-Fisher
algorithm by limiting the number of operations, pro-
vided that the Edit distance is less than a given thresh-
old k. It runs in O(m×k) time which improves the com-
plexity significantly when the sequences are lengthy.
2.2 Oblivious Transfer (OT)
In Oblivious Transfer (OT), two parties known as sender
and receiver participate in protocol. In 1-out-of-2 OT,
sender has two private messages (x0, x1) and receiver
has a selection bit r ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol,
the receiver only learns xr and learns no information
about x1−r and the sender learns nothing about r. In
its generalized form i.e., 1-out-of-n OT, the sender has n
messages {x0, ..., xn−1} while the receiver has a selection
value r ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} to obtain xr.
Preliminary OT-based protocols consist of expen-
sive public-key operations while recent improvements of
OT, called OT-extension [4, 16], allow executing many
OTs using only symmetric operations with a constant
and small number (κ) of public-key operations as base-
OTs.
To perform base OTs, we can use either homomor-
phic encryption or Deffie-Hellman key exchange proto-
col [9]. In our implementation, we use the latter one as
follows:
The sender selects a random number a ∈ Zp and
sends A = ga to the receiver (g is the group genera-
tor). The receiver picks a random number b ∈ Zp and
calculates B = gb (if r = 0) or B = Agb (if r = 1).
He then sends B to the sender. The sender calculates
k0 = H(Ba) and k1 = H((B/A)a) such that k0 and
k1 act as the secret keys in a symmetric encryption
E. Then, he encrypts its messages, e0 = Ek0(x0) ,
e1 = Ek1(x1), and sends the ciphertexts to the receiver.
Then, the receiver calculates kR = H(Ab) and decrypts
the desired message by its key as xr = DkR(er). H
stands for a secure hash function.
The security of base OT protocols directly depends
on the security of the underlying homomorphic encryp-
tion or Deffie-Hellman protocols. In particular, Deffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol is secure due to the
hardness of computing discrete logarithms. Now, the re-
sults obtained from the execution of the base-OT are
used to perform many OTs efficiently using lightweight
symmetric operations.
The OT extension protocol proposed in [16] is the
recent optimization of OT extensions, specially for short
messages, that supports 1-out-of-n (n > 2) OT in addi-
tion to 1-out-of-2 OT. We adopt this algorithm in our
secure comparison protocol.
3 The Proposed Approach
In this section, we first propose our secure comparison
protocol. Then, introduce our algorithm for privacy pre-
serving Edit distance.
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3.1 ESCOT Protocol
Unlike classic distance measures like Euclidean distance
which are composed of four basic mathematical oper-
ations (+,−,×,÷), Edit distance is based on boolean
comparison. It checks whether two specific characters
from two separate sequences are equal (Algorithm ??,
Line 18).
We propose a novel protocol for secure compari-
son based on OT called ESCOT . For example, X =
{x0, ..., xm−1} and Y = {y0, ..., ym′−1} are respectively
the client and server’s sequences in an alphabet set of
size n. If we encode the characters as numbers, the code
value vary from 0 to n − 1. The goal of secure com-
parison is to check whether xi and yj are equal where
0 ≤ xi, yj ≤ n− 1.
In ESCOT protocol, client acts as the receiver and
server acts as the sender in OT. Sender generates n num-
ber of OT messages for each character yj in its sequence
as follows:
Mk(0≤k≤n−1) =
{
1 if (k − yj) mod n = 0
0 else (1)
On the other side, receiver puts the value of xi as
its selection bit. Since the number of OT messages is
n, execution of 1-out-of-n OT is required. The logic of
this protocol is that if xi and yj are the same, then
1 will be transferred; otherwise, 0 will be transferred.
Since the length of OT messages is one bit, execution of
the 1-out-of-n protocol proposed in [16] is highly fit for
our problem as it is the most efficient protocol known
today for short-length messages. ESCOT protocol to
compare xi and yj is described in Algorithm 1.
Correctness Analysis: The message correspond-
ing to the selection bit is transferred (Mxi). Intuitively,
if xi = yj then the condition (k − yj) mod N = 0 is
satisfied and the message is 1. If xi <> yj then the
transferred message is 0.
Security Analysis: The security of ESCOT de-
pends on security of the underlying OT protocol. The
receiver only receives the message corresponding to its
selection bit and gain no information about the other
messages. The sender will not learn any thing about the
selection bit. In addition, in the Edit distance algorithm
we consider in this paper, only sequences with enough
similarity (based on the threshold k) are processed to
the end and if the Edit distance exceeds the threshold
then the execution will stop. This way, we can minimize
the information leakage.
Communication Analysis: For each comparison,
the communication bandwidth takes κ+ n bits where κ
is security parameter. Edit distance algorithm requires
k×m number of comparisons so the consumption of the
bandwidth is (k ×m)× (κ+ n) bits in our algorithm.
3.2 Private Edit Distance based on
ESCOT:
In Algorithm 2, we combine Ukkonen’s Edit distance
algorithm [19] with our ESCOT protocol to address
privacy preserving Edit distance.
4 Experiments
To calculate Edit distance between two sequences, ES-
COT protocol executes k × m times, where k is the
distance threshold and m is the maximum length of the
input sequences.
Threat Model: Our threat model is semi-honest
that means both sender and receiver follow the protocol
specification accurately and do not try to change their
messages in order to obtain private information from
other party. The only information they learn is the result
of the comparison.
Security Parameters: We evaluate our approach
with different public key security parameters ϕ ∈
{1024, 2048} for bas-OTs. The symmetric security pa-
rameter κ which determine the number of base-OTs is
set to 80 or 128.
Dataset:We evaluate our proposed approach using
a genome database released by “iDASH Security and
Privacy Workshop 2016" [1]. Briefly, the server holds a
database of 50 different sequences and client holds one
sequence to be evaluated against all the sequences in
the database. The length of the sequences in average is
3500 characters from {A,C,G, T} alphabet set. There-
fore, the value of n in 1-out-of-n OT would be 4.
Setup: We evaluate our approach with respect
to execution time and communication bandwidth. The
goal of performance evaluation is to show the feasibility
of ESCOT protocol in real-world genome matching sce-
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narios. We implement the framework in Java while client
and server communicate through sockets. We run the
framework over both LAN andWAN networks. For LAN
setting, we use the VM machines provided by “iDASH
Security and Privacy Workshop 2016" so, we can provide
a fair comparison with state of the art work [3] which
run the experiments on the same VM machines. For
WAN, we use an intercontinental cloud setting and per-
form the experiments on two free-tier Amazon instances
with a 64-bit Intel Xeon dualcore CPU with 2.8 GHz
and 3.75 GB RAM. The client and server are located in
Oregon and Tokyo respectively. Evaluation over WAN
gives us a better approximation of real-world scenar-
ios. All the experiments are the average of 10 execution
rounds.
Results: We set Edit distance threshold k to 60,
80 and 100. The goal is to return the sequences with
equal or less than the threshold k distance to the client
sequence. Obviously, by increasing the threshold the
complexity O(k × m) increases. Experimental results
are shown in Figure 1 with different security parame-
ters (ϕ ∈ {1024, 2048}, κ ∈ 80, 128). Figures (a) and
(b) measures the running time in second on LAN and
WAN network respectively while Figure (c) shows the
bandwidth consumption in KB. Execution time varies
from 8 to 38 seconds on LAN and 45 to 75 seconds on
WAN. The execution time on WAN is higher due to net-
work latency. Bandwidth directly depends on symmet-
ric security parameter κ or number of base-OTs, as it is
shown in Figure (c) the public-key security parameter
ϕ does not affect the communication. The bandwidth
varies from 18 to 40 MB.
Analysis: The private Edit distance protocols pro-
posed in [21] and [3] are executed in 516 and 23 seconds
respectively on the same dataset and over the same VM
machines with baseline security parameters (ϕ = 1024
and κ = 80). While, our proposed protocol runs only
in 8 seconds with same configuration. The other advan-
tage of our approach over [3] is that ESCOT protocol
calculates accurate Edit distance while the other work
approximates the Edit distance.
4.1 Related Work
Shantanu and Boufounos proposed an approach to cal-
culate Edit distance using HE [2]. They reduced the
problem to privacy-preserving minimum finding proto-
col that should be executed m × m′ times (m and m′
are the length of the input sequences). Huang et al.
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Fig. 1. Privacy Preserving Edit Distance Performance Evaluation
proposed a protocol to calculate Edit distance based on
Garbled circuits [14].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient solution for
privacy preserving Edit distance using OT extension
for the first time without losing accuracy. To do this,
we proposed ESCOT protocol for boolean comparison
based on 1-out-of-n OT inspired by recent advances in
secure two-party computation and Oblivious Transfer.
We evaluate our approach on a genome dataset released
by iDASH 2016 [1]. The experimental results confirm
the efficiency of our approach over state of the art ef-
forts for privacy preserving Edit distance.
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